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ABSTRACT
Over the past two decades, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has enlarged several
times to include a number of new countries. The first two case studies that are analyzed within
this paper include key countries that were added in the 1999 and 2004 rounds of NATO
enlargement: Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. The third case study takes a closer look at
two countries, Ukraine and Georgia, that sought to become members of NATO but were denied
Membership Action Plans (MAPs) because of Russian discontent and military intervention. It is
questionable if Russia will use military force to disrupt the territorial sovereignty of future
prospective NATO candidate countries. This paper aims to identify the trend between countries
seeking NATO membership and Russian intervention within these countries. Poland joined
NATO in 1999, and much to Moscow’s dislike, NATO’s borders expanded farther into Eastern
Europe. The Baltic States, Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania, joined NATO in 2004, pushing the
NATO border right against Russia’s northwestern front. This gave western alliances the ability to
host military operations through NATO on the Russian border. It is apparent that Moscow has
done everything in its power to prevent more countries that share a border with Russia from
joining NATO. Only three months after the Bucharest Summit in 2008, Russia invaded two
territories in Georgia. After the pro-Russian president in Ukraine was ousted in 2014, Russia
invaded Eastern Ukraine and annexed the Crimean Peninsula. In order to be offered a MAP, the
candidate country must have complete sovereignty over its territory. By invading key points
within both Georgia and Ukraine, Russia was delaying their ability to become members of the
security alliance. It is apparent that there is a connection between increased NATO collaboration
with countries that border Russia, and military action taken upon those countries by Russia.
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INTRODUCTION TO NATO ENLARGEMENT AND RUSSIAN RESPONSE
Thesis and Main Argument
The research question that I answer within this paper is: Why are relations between
NATO and Russia degrading, and how can further conflict between potential candidate states
and Russia be prevented? My argument is that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
cannot continue on its path of enlargement if it aims to continue any working relationship with
Russia. Expanding the membership of NATO to include Central European countries and the
Baltic states alarmed Russia, and the possible addition of other countries, such as Ukraine and
Georgia, is seen by Russia as a direct threat to their national security. Though NATO seeks to
solve grander problems like international terrorism, it still serves a purpose in protecting its
member states from outside threats. Within this paper, I intend to discuss both Poland and the
Baltic States joining NATO, possible candidate countries receiving MAPs, and the realities that
the international community will face with regard to further NATO enlargement.
My hypothesis is that if NATO continues on its path of complete European enlargement,
there will be an increase of conflicts between Russia and potential NATO candidates. Russia
sees further NATO expansion as a threat to its national security, and a malicious attempt to
negate its influence in the surrounding regions. Even though if NATO conducted another round
of enlargement, it would be difficult to do so based on an underlying factor: Russia’s desire to
remain a regional superpower. Some of the current countries that are being vetted for NATO
membership are Georgia and Ukraine. These states would provide NATO with an enormous
advantage in the region because of their geographic location, and shared borders with Russia.
Though this may be the case, it is also in Russia’s interest for these states to not become a part of
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NATO. With these countries remaining non-member states of NATO, Russia is able to retain a
high level of influence among them. In addition, Russia’s goal of retaining its regional hegemon
status would be made a reality if it were able to form a structure similar to the one it possessed
before the fall of the Soviet Union; the Warsaw Pact. Within this paper, I will analyze the
aforementioned aspects of Russia – NATO relations, and conclude with the possibilities of what
the international order will look like, given NATO enlargement continues or halts.
The variables that are present within this situation are as follows. The independent
variables of the enlargement process include candidate countries willingness to join the security
alliance and NATO’s intentions, regarding enlargement. Dependent variables in the situation
include the Russia’s reaction to the enlargement process based on geography and its relationship
to the state, and the path that will be taken after the initial process to expand NATO is suggested.
Within the body of this paper, I will identify several variables, connect their relationship with
real world events, identify the possible outcomes of enlargement, and Russia’s reaction to the
potential enlargement process.
The relationships between the variables mentioned are not black and white, and often will
become interconnected. Russia has grown aggravated by the enlargement process that NATO has
been conducting since 1999. They feel cheated and threatened, as NATO first stood to serve as a
counter weight to the Warsaw Pact. Though it serves to also combat global issues, such as
international terrorism, it still acts as a security alliance that jeopardizes Russia’s ability to exert
influence in the surrounding regions. Throughout this paper, I will analyze the relationships
between variables regarding Russia, NATO, and the international structure.
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It’s difficult to assess whether or not the relationship of each variable is positive or
negative. Though for the most part, the relationship regarding NATO enlargement and
diplomatic relations between NATO member states, potential candidates, and Russia, is a
negative one. If NATO enlargement occurs against Russia’s will, the state is bound to react
poorly. This brings to light an interesting question: is NATO enlargement worth aggravating
Russia?
Topic Significance
This topic is particularly significant because of the rising tensions between NATO and
Russia, the recent events that have transpired in Ukraine and Georgia, and the intention NATO
has of expanding. NATO’s enlargement process serves as a threat to Russia’s foreign policy
interests and in order to prevent future conflicts from occurring between NATO, candidate states,
and Russia, the decision to continue or temporarily halt NATO expansion must be decided upon.
The theoretical importance of this topic relates to the possibility of future conflict
occurring in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and North Asia. As seen in the past decade, Russia
will act accordingly to preserve its interests in the surrounding regions. In order for Europe and
the surrounding regions to remain secure, a decision regarding future enlargement processes
must be made.
The policy importance of the topic stems directly from a desire to prevent future conflicts
and the degradation of relations between NATO and Russia. The foreign policy initiative of
enlargement directly effects NATO’s relationship with Russia in either a positive or negative
way. If the enlargement process continues, relations with Russia will degrade. If the enlargement
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process is halted (with regard to states that border Russia), then relations with Russia will mostly
likely elevate in a positive manner.
Literature Review
The following includes the main points of articles that have been written about the topic
at hand: Russia – NATO Relations. Within this literature review are articles from journals that
contain information relevant to Poland, The Baltics, Ukraine, Georgia, Russia, the enlargement
process of NATO, and factual information about NATO and Russia. This includes a look at the
opinions and research done by other scholars with relation to the information I have collected to
write this paper.
(1979) Poland's Preparation for World War Two1: Within this article, Peszke talks about
Poland’s preparation for World War Two. He discusses why Poland fought unlike any other
country in Europe, and the historical relevance to fighting off foreign invaders. This journal is
instrumental to gaining a background knowledge of Poland during the prewar era. In order to
analyze the power dynamic between NATO, Poland, and Russia, it’s necessary to first
understand the pretext that Poland had to security alliances in the 20th century.
(1995) Partnership for Peace and Beyond2: Borawski discusses NATO enlargement and
the Partnership for Peace program within this article. Written in 1995, this work was made only a
few years before the round of NATO enlargement with Poland, the Czech Republic and
Hungary. This document brings up interesting points about adding Central European countries
into the security alliance, and expanding the Partnership for Peace program. This work
specifically contains information within the PfP, such as the ability for countries to tailor the
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program to their needs. The author also mentions that active participation in the Partnership for
Peace will shape NATO expansionism for years to come.
(1995) Russian Opposition to NATO Expansion3: In this article, Lieven expands upon
Russian concerns that revolve around NATO expansionism. An important piece of information
within this work is Russia’s expected response to including Poland, Hungary, and the Czech
Republic within NATO. American diplomats assured Russia that including these countries into
the security alliance would not be with malicious intent toward Russia. However, it is obvious
that adding these countries directly threatens Russia’s ability to remake a similar structure to that
of the Soviet Union. This work will be used to back up the idea that NATO is a pivotal way for
the United States to assert its influence in Eastern Europe.
(1995) The Folly of Rapid NATO Expansion4: Kamp discusses NATO expansionism and
the negative attributes that can come from its occurrence within this article. While countries in
Eastern Europe urge their membership status be expedited, the author raises several important
questions about expansion eastward. These questions include points such as the possible grantee
of security from aggravators, nuclear weapons dilemmas, and Russia’s reaction to an eastward
expansion. One of the main points of discussion in this piece is the implication of invoking
Article 5. Are members of the alliance ready to assist in military combat and aid if a threat arises
and affects a member state?
(1996) Reforming NATO5: The author, Kaiser, discusses the path that NATO will take
for the years to come in this article. The aspects of deterrence are brought to light, mentioning
the ability for NATO to combat potential post-Soviet aggression within Eastern Europe. In
addition, this journal talks about the ability for NATO to promote democracy, act as a peace
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stabilizer, and become a mechanism to establish a U.S. led international order. Kaiser also brings
up the challenges that NATO will face, such as continued expansion and the non-proliferation of
nuclear weapons. Within this piece, information regarding the implications of expansion are
touched upon. This journal was written before the wave of expansion that included Poland, the
Czech Republic and Hungary, and the insight the author provides for the consequences of adding
those countries is invaluable.
(1998) Nattering NATO Negativism? Reasons Why Expansion May Be a Good Thing6:
In this article, Ball touches upon very important topics that surround NATO and Central Europe.
This section particularly highlights the positive contributions that NATO expansionism holds for
European countries that could be threatened by an aggressive Russian foreign policy. The author
argues that NATO expansionism could counter Russian revisionism, and could benefit nonNATO states. What the author means by this is that NATO expanding to include more European
countries would deter Russia from rebuilding a multi-state empire similar to that of the Soviet
Union. In addition, non-member states would benefit from expansionism, for instance Ukraine,
because if Poland is a member of NATO, Russia would be less likely to outwardly provoke
Ukraine militarily due to fears of Polish assistance (and thus NATO military assistance).
(1999) Poland — The Road to 19897: Within in his article, Raymond discusses the
difficulties that Poland had during its time in the Soviet Union, as well as its evolution from a
member of the Soviet Union to a sovereign country. Raymond highlights the ways in which
Poland received outside assistance, such as Radio Free Europe, and how the Polish population
became increasingly nationalistic. The author does an incredible job of describing Poland’s time
in the Soviet Union, and the measures that were taken to transition into a capitalist country. This
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journal will be particularly helpful to reference when I write the section within the first chapter
about Poland’s history and relationship with Europe after World War Two.
(2000) Reviewed Work: The Future of NATO8: Enlargement, Russia, and European
Security by Charles-Philippe: In this article, Baev reviews David’s “the Future of NATO:
Enlargement, Russia, and European Security.” This work primarily focuses on the debates on
NATO enlargement, with regard to Western and Central European views. In addition, the work
that the author is reviewing provides a powerful insight on the reasons Poland sought to join
NATO.
(2002) Uneasy Expansion: NATO and Russia9: In this article, Franekova particularly
discusses the implications of NATO expansionism with relation to including smaller Eastern
European countries into the alliance. While the security alliance is concerned primarily with
security and stability of countries that are not large enough to protect themselves, NATO tries
primarily to concern itself with the collective security of Europe. This, however, implies that the
NATO border will move closer to Russia’s western border. This is especially seen with NATO’s
inclusion of the Baltic countries, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.
(2004) Expansion of NATO: Russia's Dilemma10: This article discusses the importance of
NATO in multiple spheres: It’s involvement with creating a more secure Europe and its purpose
in fighting threats such as terrorism. The author, Gidadhubli, brings up that NATO continued to
be relevant in the sphere of combating terrorism and other avenues other than protecting
countries from a more aggressive Russia, however Russia views NATO to be completely
irrelevant if not to prevent the country from gaining regional influence. Gidahubli mentions that
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NATO and Russia have conflicting views regarding expansionism, and the conflicting views
could inevitably result in rising tensions.
(2010) NATO’s Final Frontier: Why Russia Should Join NATO11: Kupchan discusses the
necessity of finding a common ground between Russia and NATO. As written, Russia is an
essential part of dealing with global problems such as counterterrorism, Iran’s nuclear ambitions,
energy security, the stabilization of Afghanistan, and energy security. The expansion of NATO
makes Russia’s placement within the international community more pressing. Russia outlined
NATO as a primary external threat in their 2010 military doctrine. The U.S. continues to see and
use NATO as a tool for power projection in Europe, however the European members see the
military alliance as a tool to build a stable, peaceful, and unified Europe. The author list five
arguments as to why Russia should be integrated into NATO. The first being that Russia’s
inclusion would create collective security through integration. The second argument is that its
inclusion would restore the transatlantic European link the U.S. needs as a partner, considering
how slow the EU moves on matters of defense. The third argument is that Russia’s inclusion
would allow for a peaceful integration of Ukraine and Georgia, without a crisis in Moscow. The
fourth argument is that Russia’s inclusion would ensure the alliances control of evolution in the
Transatlantic space. The fifth argument is that Russia’s inclusion would allow for the alliance to
broaden its scope; the alliance would be able to expand its horizons past its own neighborhood.
Though NATO would be running a strategic risk by including Russia, the security alliance runs a
greater risk by not including the state.
(2010) The two-headed Russian eagle, European partner or outsider12: The author of this
article, Lenzi, talks about the history of Russia’s relations with NATO, and the interactions the
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state has had with its neighbors (future NATO countries). The article portrays that the time has
come for a triangular alliance between the U.S., mainland Europe, and Russia. This would
essentially link Euro-American and Euro-Asian geopolitics, something that should have been a
priority after World War 2 and, later, the Cold War. The author talks about how it is too
ambitious to create a new alliance or structure. The alliance and relationship between Russia and
NATO should be “a garden that’s supported, steadily tended, and grown organically through
accumulation.
(2011) Multilateralism, Multipolarity, and Beyond13: A Menu of Russia’s Policy
Strategies: Makarychev discusses the idea of a Multipolar and Unipolar system in relation to the
East and West within this article. The multipolar approach of viewing the international
community are in direct contradiction to the Western “collective unilateralism” view. This would
include an all-encompassing security alliance (one that would include Russia in NATO). Though
this sounds like a framework for the international community that could work, it would hardly
result in the idea of equality of all participants in the international system. The author doesn’t
address this point, but if Russia were to join NATO at this point, the state would be part of a
much gander, Western led coalition, and would most likely be subordinate to Western dictation.
As mentioned in a previous article discussed in this excerpt, the requirements and implications of
joining NATO would need to be altered before Russia joins a Western led security alliance
(completing a Transatlantic security alliance).
(2011) The U.S. Debate on NATO Nuclear Deterrence14: Yost directly addresses the
nuclear stockpile within Europe, how it should be decreased (if at all), and the terms of which
Russia will be involved with creating a denuclearized Europe within this article. It’s the long-
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term policy that responsibility agreements, such as shared nuclear weapons, contribute to
deterrence prevention and provide assurance to allies of U.S. commitments. It’s from this stance
that the U.S. should not make any strides to decrease the Nuclear Stockpile in Europe without an
agreement from Russia providing reductions as well (with the appropriate level of transparency).
There are counter arguments made that go on to discuss why the U.S. should reduce the stockpile
regardless, but because of the topic, I’d like to address the bilateral stance that Russia and the
U.S. should both reduce stockpiles respectively.
(2011) A Cool App for "Strategic Partnership" with Russia15: In this article, Horlohe
wrote about a deal between Russia and France, effectively delivering two modern helicopter
carriers to Russia in 2014. In addition, he talks about how two more warships were going to be
constructed in Russia. Overall, the author discusses Russia’s acquisition of new weaponry in a
number of ways. France delivering helicopters to Russia was considered to be the biggest arms
transfer between a NATO member state and Russia ever. Not only does this set a precedence for
arms transactions between member states and Russia, but it also makes Russia more dependent
on Western technology.
(2012) Signatures of Partnership for Peace Framework Document16: The information
retrieved from this website is official NATO statistics that pertain to the Partnership for Peace
program. On this web page, NATO provides a list of countries that have ratified the Partnership
for Peace and lists the year that the respective country did so. Using this information to back up
data about Poland’s involvement with the Partnership for Peace is crucial when discussing the
country’s bilateral cooperation with NATO.
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(2012) Europe as Seen from Russia17: Baranovsky writes about how Russia is concerned
by the marginal position given to it in European politics within this article. The issue is that
Russia views itself as a part of Europe, but is often marginalized by its relationship with the
West. Both liberal and conservative Russians have different viewpoints as to how Russia should
be seen in Europe and further integrated with other European countries. Though Russia has
enough resources to be a self-sufficient power within Europe, the EU is Russia’s largest trade
partner. The author goes on to talk about how ordinary Russians are connected to center and
western Europe. He asserts the aspect that ordinary Russians are most concerned with visas and
travel to other European countries. That being said, further integration of Russia into Europe
(possibly the EU or NATO) would allow visa free travel.
(2014) NATO Enlargement and Russia: Discerning Fact from Fiction18: In this work,
Rühle discusses misconceptions that are often attributed to the relationship between NATO and
Russia. With Russia’s new aggression regarding NATO enlargement, NATO’s reaction by
halting the expansion process is seen as a temporary decision. Russia often expresses its
discontent with the expansion because of the “broken promises” the west made that it wouldn’t
expand NATO past a unified Germany. Though said, there has never been binding contracts or
documents that say NATO would not expand past these borders. The article goes on to say that
Russia has never received a formal invitation to join NATO. These facts however continue to
distract from the bigger and more important issue at hand: how to create a secure Europe without
aggravating Russia in the process of enlargement.
(2015) NATO Enlargement and Russia: Myths and Realities19: In this work, Rühle
discusses the realities of NATO enlargement with relation to Russia. Several points are made
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within his work, however one that particularly stood out was the notion that Russia sees NATO
expansion as a direct threat to its national security. Also, Rühle notes that Russia views NATO
expansion into Eastern Europe as a “broken promise,” after the reunification of Germany. This
work is an important source when referring to the actualities of NATO enlargement, and instead
of answering standard questions about the process, this work brings up many new intricate and
interesting questions that the reader is left to answer.
(2016) North European security after the Ukraine conflict20: Within this work, Atland
discusses the outcome of the 2014 annexation of Crimea by Russia. Atland views the actions
taken by Russia to be contentious, as the annexation is not legitimized by the entire international
community. Reading this work has given me a better understanding of the relationship between
Russia and Ukraine, as well as the frame of reference NATO holds on the issue. Atland also
discusses the awareness that Norway, and non-member states, Sweden and Finland, must now
have with regard to Russia as their eastern neighbor. After the 2014 annexation of Crimea, it is
obvious that NATO must reassess many aspects of its relationship with Russia.
Topic Relevance and Research Design
My writing about the topic will revolve around NATO enlargement and Russia’s
response in the following ways. I intend on initially highlighting the Poland case study. I will
describe how and why it joined NATO, and then eventually going into detail about the
international reactions created by its entrance into the alliance. Next, I will highlight the case
study of the Baltic States. Like the case study on Poland, I will describe how and why the Baltics
joined NATO, and then go into detail on international reactions to their inclusion. Following suit,
I will discuss Russia’s reaction to enlargement by highlighting both Georgia and Ukraine, and
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the actions that have transpired there. After discussing both Georgia’s and Ukraine’s
involvement with NATO and the actions taken against the two countries by Russia, I will
conclude the paper with a number of comparable factors that tie the three case studies together.
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FIRST ROUND OF NATO ENLARGEMENT: POLAND
Poland Pre-WWII
Poland had an incredibly unique position in the international community before and after
World War II. The most notable, and in some regard comprisable, aspect of this country is its
location within Europe. As one of the largest central European countries, Poland was placed in a
difficult spot leading up to 1939. With the rising threat of foreign invaders, those in charge of the
Polish government were forced to sign non-aggression treaties (one of which was in 1934), and
normalized relations with Poland and Germany for an agreed upon 10 years. This brings to light
an interesting aspect; what caused Poland to be a theater for conflict in the beginning of World
War II? To answer this question, we must first analyze the politics and decisions of countries
surrounding Poland at the time.
The Soviet Union had undergone drastic industrialization, and had taken on incredible
amounts of political and economic change since the end of World War I. With a growing
authoritarian government, the Soviet Union had set it’s aims on expanding westward; increasing
its influence and dominance over Eastern European states. Not only did this alarm the Polish
government, but it also caused Poland to look for allies that would come to its aid, given an
invasion were to occur. After their victory in 1920 against the Soviet Union, Poland entered a
state of military stagnation and deflation, regarding original equipment made domestically.
Poland was equipped with French World War I military equipment, making it difficult for
Germany or the Soviet Union to take unilateral action against the state. Poland spent time
developing their air force from the years 1925 – 1936 and enacted the six-year plan, which aimed
to develop the military into a force that could defend against foreign invaders. The six-year plan,
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however, was happening simultaneously when Hitler invaded the Rhine Province and openly
denunciated the stipulation of the Versailles treaty, limiting Germany’s military. Poland had
struggled for centuries to preserve its national identity; what it means to be Polish. In 1939,
Smigly-Rydz, a Polish statesman and commander-in-chief, said this in an interview: “We have
learnt from experience what it means to live without freedom, and we are ready to die rather than
lose it again.” As mentioned prior, the history of Poland is one in which people struggle to
preserve their national identity and culture under an alien rule, and took every available
opportunity to regain full independence21.
However, Poland’s unique geography within Europe makes it difficult to preserve their
full independence. Bordering two of the most powerful European countries in the 1930’s, Poland
was not left with many options other than siding with the Western European powers and
preparing their military for combat. In 1939, Germany began setting its aims on invading Poland.
Though Hitler was confident that the status quo would remain (Britain and France holding the
notion of appeasement), he feared that the Soviet Union might come to Poland’s aid, should
Germany invade. That same year, Germany signed a nonaggression pact with the Soviet Union
(the Ribbentrop – Molotov Pact), declaring that the two countries would remain in a state of noncombat with one another. However, a secret stipulation of this treaty divided Poland into an East
and West portion, two halves that would be occupied by the Soviet Union and Germany
respectively. With the German invasion finally occurring in early September, Poland was able to
mobilize about a million soldiers to fight. However, the force of the Polish military was not able
to fend off the force of Germany. The Polish armed forces hoped to hold out in Warsaw until an
offensive could be staged against Germany in the west, however the Soviet Union invaded
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Poland and the country fell. Once Poland’s government and military leaders fled the state,
Germany and the Soviet Union signed an agreement outlining the territory each country would
occupy. Yet again in history, Poland was partitioned by more powerful foreign invaders.
Poland Post-WWII
After World War II, Western Europe was in shambles and a bipolar system emerged. The
two great powers left in the international community were the United States and the Soviet
Union. With influence split down Central Europe, the Soviet Union was in complete control of
Poland. The formation of the Warsaw pact was directly met with the formation of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and Poland was under the direct influence of a communist
government22. This was simply the continuation of the Polish people’s occupation of another
foreign entity, one that did not represent the population within the state. Though an authoritarian,
communist regime until the 1989 revolutions, Poland played a significant role (if not the most
important part) in bringing about the downfall of communism in Eastern Europe (and in turn, the
Soviet Union).
Poland was notorious for fostering intelligent classes of people who sought to bring about
free thought and national culture into everyday life. During the Cold War, the west gave heavy
support to Polish dissidents fighting for human rights and freedom within the Soviet Bloc.
Programs such as ‘Radio Free Europe’ kept hope alive in communist countries during the Cold
War and would consistently encourage change23. Lech Walesa, the Polish politician who founded
Solidarity and would later become the state’s first president, said this about Radio Free Europe:
“The degree of the Radios’ impact cannot even be described. Would there be earth without the
sun?” Though Poland was under communist and military rule (martial law during the 1970s), the
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Polish people never stopped fighting their oppressors and calling for change. During the early
1970s, Solidarity was founded; the first non-communist trade union within the Soviet Union.
This was an incredible step in the direction of democracy because it allowed for a significant
amount of interaction with non-communist countries. It can be referred to as the beginning of the
end of communism, as Gorbachev began implementing policies such as Perestroika and Glasnot;
reforms that increasingly liberalized Eastern European countries within the Warsaw Pact.
The west saw Poland as an opportunity to begin transitioning Eastern European countries
into democracies. Continuing with the fall of communism in Poland and the fall of the Soviet
Union in 1991, Poland became a prime candidate for NATO membership. In 1999, the state
became a full member, strengthening the west’s grip on Europe, while simultaneously weakening
the newly formed Russian Federation. Poland looked for the west’s guidance during the 1990s,
as the state sought to transition into a full democracy and become a full participating member of
the international community. In the coming sections, Poland’s acceptance into NATO will be
analyzed, along with the international reaction of its entrance and the implications its
membership implies.
Mutual Interest in Membership
Poland, at the continental cross roads of Europe, needed a guaranteed security alliance
with more powerful countries if the state were to have any hope of remaining independent.
Though after the Cold War, it seemed as though great strides of imperialism were coming to an
end. While this may be true in many aspects, there isn’t any reason why Poland shouldn’t have
looked for opportunities to remain sovereign and independent. The initial assumption was that
NATO expansionism would remain as east as the newly reunified German state. However, after
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several talks during the 1990s, Poland and other Eastern European countries quickly became the
point of focus for additions to the collective security alliance. However, Poland is a particular
case when discussing expanding the NATO sphere of influence. Geographically positioned in the
center of Europe and bordering several countries that were a part of the Warsaw Pact, Poland
holds many unique traits that give the west a strong foothold in Eastern Europe, given the state
becomes allies with western countries. Not only is Poland a prime candidate in Europe to
become a member of NATO, but the state benefits tremendously from the alliance as well. As a
country that was, as mentioned before, occupied by foreign invaders for centuries, Poland revels
at the idea of having a strong sense of security against its powerful neighbors. Both becoming
stronger allies with western countries and gaining a more secure foothold as a sovereign country
could be achieved through Poland joining NATO.
As mentioned before, NATO was an organization that gave Poland the opportunity to
secure itself from outside invaders for one of the first times in history. There are a couple of
factors that made NATO particularly appealing to the state. A major factor was the aspect of
collective security. As a country located in Central Europe, Poland has several neighbors that
possess incredibly strong military capabilities and have tried to invade in the past. Entering a
collective security agreement with world powers, such as the United States, allows for Poland to
focus less on defense, and more on internal issues24. In addition to that point, joining NATO
allows for Poland to advance its military capabilities. When Poland was a member of the
Warsaw Pact, the Soviet Union stationed nuclear missiles and advanced weaponry within its
borders. After the Pact dissolved, there were agreements in the early 2000s to remove all nuclear
weapons from Poland. As a member of NATO (and based on its geography), Poland plays a
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significant role regarding its possession of weaponry. Should countries that are not a part of
NATO attack an Eastern European member state, Poland would be one of the first member states
to retaliate. Even though being a member of NATO does not prevent a conflict from occurring, it
deters potential conflicts because of the immense support member states receive from one
another25. In addition, Poland joining NATO fosters a new set of connections with western
countries. After Poland joined the alliance, there was an increase in trade between the country
and other member states. This can be seen in a positive light; the more Poland and western
countries become more inclusive regarding their relations, the more secure Poland becomes.
As for NATO, Poland was a prime candidate for membership due to several factors:
geographic location, historical events, and national Polish tradition. The first factor, and arguably
the most important, is Poland’s position within Europe. Bordering Russia, Belarus and Ukraine
(all states that are not members of NATO), Poland has a unique place within Europe. All three of
those Eastern European neighbors that were mentioned have increasingly moved away from
becoming members of NATO. That being said, Poland’s geographic position within Europe
makes it one of the most important members of the alliance. Another factor is Poland’s history
with its more powerful neighbors. As mentioned before, Poland has a history of being invaded,
occupied and partitioned by stronger military powers. As an alliance that exists to defend its
members, NATO saw Poland as a prime candidate because the state wanted membership26. The
last factor, taking some aspects of the previous factor, is the notion that Poland wants to be
independent. Poland becoming a member of NATO allowed for the government to focus on
creating the unique Polish identity, without having to worry about fending off invasions from
more powerful countries.
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The Road to Membership
Yet with NATO membership comes constraints and obligations. There is more at work
than simply a structure preventing war within the region (and globally). As a country that joins
the collective security organization, there are certain steps taken to ensure the fluid transition
from non-member state to member state. However, with the benefits that come from entering
NATO, there are also concessions that must be made. Poland’s entry into NATO was a warm
reassurance that the organization was succeeding. Having had joined the alliance in 1999 (along
with the Czech Republic and Hungary), Poland had already participated in several NATO
agreements such as, but not limited to, the Partnership for Peace, the Individual Partnership
Program and joint military exercises27. Within the first 10 years of the Warsaw Pact’s
dissolution, Poland had already invested in joint ventures with NATO and became a member
state.
The first of the bilateral agreements between NATO and other European countries was
the Partnership for Peace (PfP), launched in 1994. This program involved bilateral cooperation
between individual Euro-Atlantic partner countries and NATO. This allowed for partners to
build relationships with NATO, while simultaneously choosing their own priorities for
cooperation28. Levels of cooperation varied amongst states, normally including military training
exercises, disaster planning and response, policy planning, and environmental issues. In Poland’s
case particularly, the state wanted to focus on pressing issues, given the political climate right
after the fall of the Soviet Union and dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. Poland sought to
emphasize the modernization of air defense and interoperability of command and control
systems. Through the Partnership for Peace, the Polish government was able to have talks with
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NATO regarding a full future membership29. Another agreement that is important to note is the
Individual Partnership Program (IPP). In 1994, Poland became the first of the PfP countries to
agree and participate in this program. Like the PfP, the IPP was an individual program centered
at forging relations between NATO and non-member states through directed and tailored joint
efforts. As mentioned before, Poland and NATO began to collaborate through military exercises
and advancing Poland’s air defense. Through the IPP, Poland was able to get more needs specific
collaboration with NATO. Along with the initial programs spearheaded by NATO, becoming a
member requires years of discussion and agreements prior to formally entering the alliance.
Regarding Poland’s situation with joining NATO in the first round of enlargement, there
were many roundtable discussions and meetings between the leadership of NATO and the
government. However, after the first wave of enlargement, NATO created a set of guidelines that
must be met by countries, prior to their admittance. A Membership Action Plan (MAP) is a set of
criteria that the country needs to fulfill to show its process reforming several key sectors. These
sectors include, but are not limited to, the military, foreign policy, domestic policy, and territorial
disputes. MAP countries are required to upgrade their military to NATO standards and
demonstrate that their forces are under democratic control. They are required to settle ethnic and
religious disputes by peaceful means and demonstrate their commitment to human rights and rule
of law. Countries must also ensure that any domestic legislation won’t pose any obstacles in their
cooperation with NATO. MAPs that are given to countries are created specifically for each state.
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Russia’s Reaction to Poland’s Membership with NATO
Poland’s involvement with NATO made a serious impact on the international
community, changing the security structure of many institutions and effecting the manner in
which defensive security was treated in Europe. Poland’s geographically strategic placement as a
country gave NATO an advantage within Europe. As a past member of the Warsaw Pact, the
necessity for Poland to become a more western country was evident. The state borders Ukraine
and the Baltics, outlining the importance for NATO membership. This brings surfaces an
incredibly pertinent question, though: What was Russia’s reaction to Poland joining NATO in
1999? This question, in and of itself, is extremely complex and does not have a single answer
(though there are tones that are common).
In the years leading to Poland’s entry into NATO, Russia assumed that the United States
spearheading NATO expansion was a foreign policy initiative directed at securing interests in
Eastern Europe30. While this holds true to date (that NATO is an arm of the United States aimed
at projecting influence in Eastern Europe), it’s necessary to note that Russia felt a deep distrust
for the United States during the 1990s. After coming out a victor in the Cold War, the United
States was in the position to continue to look at various ways the state could assert influence in
regions. That being said, it’s obvious why Russia would oppose NATO expansion in Eastern
Europe, as Russia no longer had a grip on its sphere of influence (i.e. Former Soviet states). Why
would Russia have an issue with NATO expansion if the state no longer had hegemonic
aspirations within the region? The answer to that question is given by asking the inverse: why
does the west have any interest in Polish security if they are not threatened by Russia31? Those
two questions raise possibly the most significant point of this entire chapter. The point is not that
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the United States is concerned with Polish security. The issue that is raised from Poland joining
NATO (in Russia’s opinion) is that the United States, Russia’s main contender for decades, is in
charge of a major security alliance, who’s borders are advancing towards Russia’s western
border. While the United States may care for the security, autonomy, and implementation of
democracy in Poland, the state knew that Russia was in any place or position to begin reasserting
itself as the dominant hegemon in the region. That being said, using the events of history as an
alibi for expanding influence in Eastern Europe was a strategic step in the direction of regional
hegemony for the United States. So, how did Russia react to Poland joining NATO? Well,
Russia reacted poorly to NATO’s first enlargement, but there was nothing of significance that
could be done. Dating back to the “2+4” negotiations, Russia’s government accepted that a
reunified Germany would be within NATO. Though it was never officially recorded or written in
any documentation, Russia was under the impression that NATO expansionism would not extend
past the newly unified Germany. The fact that NATO expansionism was now going to extend to
Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary made Russia feel betrayed. Insulted and left with
dismay, Russia now saw what was happening as a direct threat to their security within Eastern
Europe. It’s impossible to categorize the expansion of NATO as anything short of weakening
Russian influence within the region32. With that being said, the decision to begin enlargement
was a serious blow to the United States having any chance of developing a strategic partnership
with Russia at that time.
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SECOND ROUND OF NATO ENLARGEMENT: THE BALTICS
The Baltics Pre-WWII
The previous chapter included a brief account of Poland’s history (before World War
Two (WWII), after WWII, after the break of the Soviet Union, and its relationship with the
international community (most notably with Russia and NATO). It was made apparent that
Poland’s geographic and historical significance were prime factors in both NATO and Russia’s
struggle for influence in the region. That being said, Poland was not the last country to play an
important role in deciding influential authority in the region. After NATO’s enlargement in
1999, the next round took place in 2004, consisting of Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia,
and most notably, the Baltic states, Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia33. The Baltics play an
important part regarding NATO’s influence in Eastern Europe, primarily because two of the
three states border Russia. Though Poland had a significant role in extending NATO’s influence
into Central and Eastern Europe, the Baltics push the security alliance’s borders against the
western most expanse of Russia’s territory. This chapter will primarily analyze the following
aspects of the Baltics. The first section will contain a brief history of the Baltic states before and
after WWII, and their role in the international community after they became independent states
following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The next section will include the path that the
Baltic states took to become members of NATO, why they did so, and reactions from the
international community. With finalizing the chapter, the relationship, since their admittance into
the security alliance in 2004, between the Baltics, NATO, and Russia will be analyzed.
The Baltic states have been a crossroads for conflict in several ways since the beginning
of the 20th century. Like Poland, the three countries have always experienced oppression and
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occupation from more powerful neighbors. It wasn’t until the 1920s, that the Baltics gained their
independence from Czarist Russia and neighboring powers34. Though independent states were
formed, the countries still suffered pressure from outside forces. For example, Lithuania was
invaded by Poland in 1920, and relations between the two countries did not increase for most of
the interwar period. The Baltic states experienced relative autonomy throughout the 1920s and
1930s, yet existed in constant awareness that invasion from a more powerful outside force could
occur. It becomes apparent, when comparing Poland with the Baltics, that the two entities have
similar characteristics that will inevitably lead them down the same path of joining NATO.
Leading into the late 1930s, Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia faced the end of their short lived
independent states. The signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in 1939 divided Eastern
European countries between Germany and the Soviet Union35. Within this agreement between
the Nazis and the Soviets, the Baltic states were placed into the Soviet Union’s sphere of
influence. In 1940, the Soviet Union invaded Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, installing proSoviet, communist governments in all three countries. During WWII, the Baltics were invaded
by Nazi Germany when they broke the non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union. The
populations of these states faced mass oppression, involving deportations, mass arrests, and
executions.
The Baltics Post-WWII
After WWII ended and German occupation ended, the allies agreed that the Baltics would
be placed within the Soviet Union’s sphere of influence once again. These states then became a
part of the Soviet Union, and more so, a part of the Warsaw Pact. As stated in the previous
chapter, the Warsaw Pact was a collective security alliance that directly countered NATO36. The
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Baltic countries, like Poland, are historically prone to outside invasion by more powerful foreign
invaders. This alliance did not assure the three states that they would be protected from further
exploitation. Their involvement simply meant a continuation of their exploitation from outside
forces. This fact further asserts the reasons that the Baltics inevitably sought to become members
of NATO, a security alliance that could thwart historically oppressive invaders. Throughout the
Cold War period, the Baltic states experienced sovietization, ranging from the collectivization of
farms to the mass deportation of people within the Baltic population. While these states were
occupied, diplomats from the previous governments of the Baltics resided within the United
States, acting as liaisons and represented the legitimate concerns of the Baltic peoples37. Leading
into the 1980s, massive protests and civil unrest took place in Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania.
Most notably in 1989, a two-million-person human chain stretched from Tallinn to Vilnius38.
This was to show the unity of the Baltic peoples; those that would rise up against and fight
oppression. Amid the mass protests and discontent populations within the Baltics, the Soviet
Union knew that losing control of the three states was inevitable39. In 1991, the Soviet Union
collapsed, recognizing Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia as independent states. The last of the
Soviet troops did not leave the Baltics until 1994, though40.
The Baltic states, now having recognized sovereignty and independence within the
international community, aimed to become integral members of international organizations and
security structures. Immediately after they regained their independence, the Baltic states joined
the United Nations in 1991. This was done through a simple adoption through the general
assembly41. More importantly, however, Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia sought to become
members of the European Union and NATO. Two organizations that are at forefront of European
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integration, if the Baltics wanted to become more of European countries and to deviate from
being under the direct influence of Russia, the three states had to quickly find the best paths to
joining both NATO and the European Union. This being said, the European Union and NATO
both wanted the Baltics to become members of their respective institutions. There are several
reasons that NATO saw the Baltic states as increasingly valuable assets, and vice versa (the
Baltics seeing NATO as a valuable asset). Viewed as nothing more than an integral part of the
Soviet Union and Czarist Russia by the outside world, the Baltics development and integration
into more European institutions changed their role in the international community42. The next
sections will evaluate the paths by which the Baltics became members of NATO, the reasons that
the three states were seen as valuable candidates for NATO, the main reasons that NATO was a
security alliance that would fulfill the needs of the Baltics, and international reactions from the
Baltic states admission into NATO.
The Road to Membership
Though these three countries were not exactly in identical positions throughout their
journey toward NATO membership, the problems they faced were particularly similar, and their
struggles toward improving their economies, military structures, and national security were
characterized by the same goal. Attempts of European integration for the Baltic states proved to
be accepted with open arms. After Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia declared their independence,
the three countries inherited devastated economies and military structures that were in poor
quality43. Strides to improve their economies and military structures were almost immediate, in
part because the Baltic states saw the necessities of active reforms as direct paths to NATO
membership. After the 1999 round of enlargement, that incorporated the Czech Republic,

27

Hungary, and Poland, the Membership Action Plan (MAP) was launched (mentioned in the
previous chapter). This program was designed to give aspiring member countries a pathway into
NATO membership, as well as assistance to fulfill the requirements candidate states needed to
meet44. A key component of each MAP given to the Baltics, with regard to the requirements
states needed to meet, was the assurance that each state could contribute to the organization’s
defense and ensure territorial national sovereignty. The latter proved to be quite simple – Russia
was not in any position to reclaim the Baltics via military intervention before their admittance in
2004. In addition, Russia saw its relationship with NATO as one that needed to be improved and
fostered, not tarnished by acts of imperialism (this will be expanded upon later in the chapter).
As for defense, all three countries decided on comprehensive plans with relation to their
organization of their forces45. Using western institutions and NATO military structuring as a
jumping off point, the Baltics organized defense configurations by developing capable land selfdefense forces (through the use of training facilities, peace and wartime logistic systems, and
updated equipment for land forces). The Baltic states saw the necessity to modernize their
militaries and make them capable of training and operating with NATO forces46. As past
members of the Partnership for Peace, NATO assisted the Baltic states with policy planning,
disaster planning and response, and most notably, military-to-military cooperation. Mentioned
previously in this chapter, the Baltics joined NATO in 2004. However, here were multiple
factors that played a hand in their accession. Timing, being one factor, gave the Baltic countries
a huge leg up on states such as Georgia and Ukraine. Although aspiring states such as Georgia
and Ukraine were (and still are) in line for NATO membership, both states had not met minimum
requirements to join the security alliance. The Baltic states were able to quickly turn to the West
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and mirror democratic institutions, such as free elections and market economies47. Due to this
factor, Latvia, Lithuania, and notably, Estonia, were able to more quickly meet the requirements
outlined in their MAPs. Another factor that contributed to the Baltic states expedience with
joining NATO, was the strategic positioning that NATO would gain if Lithuania, Latvia, and
Estonia became members. While these countries did all reform rather quickly, the interest that
NATO had with sharing a border with Russia cannot go unnoticed. The next section will delve
into the reasons that NATO was an ideal international organization for the Baltics, and why the
Baltics were prime candidates for NATO.
Mutual Interest in Membership
There are several ways to view why NATO valued the Baltics as credible and necessary
members for the security alliance. An initial, and more secondary reason, that the Baltics were
prime candidate states for NATO was the fact that they were able to meet the requirements that
NATO set to become members. Stemming from the reality that the Baltics saw NATO
membership as a route into stability and ensured security from outside military threats, the three
countries took it upon themselves to begin making reforms. Beginning second generation
reforms included judicial and tax reform, budgetary and policymaking transparency, etc.; all
necessary to move forward with democratic transitions48. This choice both modernized the
Baltics and made offering the three countries a bid easier for NATO.
Mentioned in the previous chapter about Poland, geopolitics play an enormous role in
shaping international security and influence. Estonia and Latvia lie on Russia’s western border,
and Lithuania bordering Belarus, making the three countries incredibly valuable partners for
combating encroaching Russian influence in Eastern Europe. NATO was created to counter the
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Warsaw Pact (as mentioned in the previous chapter). After its dissolution, the security alliance
gathered the purpose of fighting international terrorism and protecting smaller, for the most part
European, countries from foreign threats. It would only seem natural for the international
organization to incorporate the Baltic states, seeing as they are three former soviet republics and
act as a gateway into sharing a board with Russia. Similar to the first round of NATO
enlargement, NATO was gaining countries that move its border farther east. Admitting the
Baltics into NATO directly benefited the organization in two ways: Russia lost the ability/option
of exerting military pressure on the Baltics and gave NATO the ability to build military bases in
countries that share a border with Russia. The factor of the Baltic state’s location now played an
enormous role in NATO’s geopolitical influence.
Continuing on the topic of the Baltics providing a better geostrategic positioning for
NATO, the military presence that the west was now able to exert in Eastern Europe increased
significantly. Surpassing the initial assistance that NATO and western countries provided to the
Baltics prior to admission (regarding updating their military), the 2014 Wales Summit brought
about the introduction of the Readiness Action Plan (RAP). This called for new deterrence
measures and military procedures, broadly welcomed by the Baltic states49. A stipulation of the
RAP features a 5000-strong Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) created within the
NATO Response Force (NRF). Also, the air forces of more than 10 NATO states have been
heavily involved in patrolling Baltic airspace since 2004. After the 2014 invasion of Crimea, the
RAP and air patrol by allies was scaled up significantly. The Baltic states have made it apparent
that they would prefer permanent military presences within their countries, as the RAP involves
a “response” mechanism to threats, after they occur. It is interesting to note that one of the core
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beliefs that Russia held about the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act, is that there would be no
military build-up along the Eastern European border. That would include military bases and
permanent military personnel. However, the act does not prohibit the establishment of permanent
NATO bases in Central and Eastern Europe50. Russia’s involvement with the entirety of the
Baltic inclusion will be touched upon later in this chapter, but for now, the comparison should be
made between what Russia “thought” about the Founding Act of 1997 and NATO enlargement
in general. Just as Russia was made an empty promise that NATO would not expand past a
reunified Germany, the notion that there would be no permanent military buildup along Eastern
Europe is also not true. On that note, Russia accused the United States of violating a peace treaty
between Moscow and NATO, after the United States sent new military forces to the Baltic
region51. This is due to the fact that Russia has been increasing its military presence along its
western border with the Baltics. The result of both NATO and Russia militarizing their borders?
a security dilemma.
Russia’s Reaction to The Baltic States’ Membership with NATO
So, what was Russia’s reaction from the Baltics states joining NATO? Has Russia taken
action against the Baltics since their admittance into the security alliance? Well, immediately
prior to their accession, Russian leaders declared that Baltic entry into NATO was the
metaphorical “line in the sand.” Gennadii Selezev, speaer of the State Duma in Russia, told
journalists that Baltic admission into NATO would require Russia to review its part in the
Founding Act of 199752. In attempts to persuade the Baltics from joining NATO, Yeltsin offered
multiple security initiatives to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania with the intention of creating
mutual agreements that would follow in suit. This ended up failing and pushed the Baltics further
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into talks of accession with NATO. It was obvious that Russia was going to do everything in its
power to keep the Baltics in its sphere of influence. Evidence of this was shown by Russia’s
reluctance to withdraw troops from the Baltic states (after the collapse of the Soviet Union), a
strong reluctance to give up control of military instillations, attempts to retain control of a
corridor to Kaliningrad through Lithuania, and a refusal to sign border agreements for a certain
amount of time53. This was an important turning point for Russia, seeing as NATO expanded
farther into Eastern Europe and against Russia’s western border, directly against the wishes of
Moscow. Remaining on the subject of Russia’s reaction and response to Baltic NATO
membership, Russia has indirectly attacked these three countries (as well as others) with the
purpose of destabilization and misinformation.
In 2007, the Estonian government decided to remove a statue commemorating Soviet
soldiers killed in WWII. This was condemned by the Kremlin, but the Estonian government went
ahead with its removal regardless. After the decision was made, critical portions of Estonia’s
online media, banking, and government architecture were hit by a wave of digital attacks that
crashed numerous websites. The 2007 operation also involved misinformation tactics (i.e. users
were redirected to photos of soviet soldiers or fake news stories). These cyber techniques would
be redefined in later years during Russia’s attacks on Georgia and Ukraine54.
Russian armament along its western border with Estonia, Latvia and Belarus has occurred
for some time now. However, Moscow planned to send over 100,000 troops and artillery to the
western border in preparation for war games that are set to take place in 201755. This is military
build-up is not a response to sanctions placed on Russia by the west, but instead, a show of
military might. This build up, provocative in nature, causes the Baltics (and NATO) to respond

32

with a mutual armoring on the borders of Estonia and Latvia. Since then, there has been serious
discussion regarding NATO, the countries that will participate in future rounds of enlargement,
and Russia’s aggressive foreign policy against aspiring NATO members.
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RUSSIA’S RESPONSE TO NATO ENLARGEMENT:
GEORGIA AND UKRAINE
Enlargement after 2004
As mentioned in the previous chapter, NATO has continued to perform enlargement
processes that admit states, given they meet the criteria to join the security alliance. This has
been met with much contention from Russia, as the state sees NATO enlargement as a direct
threat to their national security, interests in surrounding regions, and foreign policy. Previous
rounds of enlargement, chiefly in 2004 when seven countries (including the Baltic states) joined
NATO, have made serious impacts regarding how Russia continued developing militarily and
interacting with its neighbors. Whereas once Russia had full control over these states, the 2004
round of enlargement created an uncertainty within Moscow. With the Baltics becoming
members of NATO, it became a reality that NATO forces and military facilities could place
themselves on Russia’s western border (shared with the Baltics). This prompted a series of
responses and decisions by Russia regarding how to continue their foreign policy within the
region. After the Baltics entered NATO, Russia’s Security Council was called upon to consider
deploying additional forces to regions bordering NATO members56. During that same time, the
Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Aleksandr Yakovenko, said that “this expansion
certainly touched upon Russia's political, military and economic interests and hence, Russia
might have to change its already declared policy of unilaterally demilitarizing the zone around
the Baltic states.” The Baltic states’ entrance to NATO could be attributed to several factors, one
of which being their instilled historical fear of Soviet dominance in the region, and their desire to
remain sovereign and autonomous. With the addition of these new members, the United States
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had stated that Russia was not the “enemy.” This prompted Russia to adopt a resolution outlining
the need for NATO to take into account Russia’s opinion on expanding to more Eastern
European states. While NATO expansionism was still to occur, its transgression would happen
regardless of Russia’s agreement. A large part of the reason Russia was adamantly against
NATO’s expansion stems from the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. As contending security
alliances, it was viable to have both. However, with the Warsaw Pact gone, Russia viewed the
existence (and expansion) of NATO as both unnecessary and aggressive. The security alliance
still existed, though, to serve as a vassal in combating other international issues aside from a
Russian threat, such as terrorism (which Russia experienced as well). Russia still uncomfortable
with the idea of bases being set up in the Baltics, Russian Defense Minister (at the time) Sergei
Ivanov argued that Russia should have monitoring facilities set up at the bases to ensure that the
arms of the NATO facilities pose no threat to Russia’s security. NATO officials denied any
possibility of this becoming a reality, immediately dismantling any hope of a comfortable
agreement being made between Russia and the security alliance. Continuing with several other
disagreements, ranging from defense exercises to air surveillance flights, the accession of the
Baltic states to NATO further strengthened its Anti-Russian make-up, according to Mikhail
Margelov, the chairman of the Russian Federation for the Council International Relations
Committee.
Two Prospective Candidate States
With the security alliance now comprising 29 member states, there are still several
countries that are seen as primary candidates for NATO membership. Two of these countries are
Ukraine and Georgia, located in Eastern Europe and Northwest Asia respectively. These two

35

countries provide strategic locations for NATO influence, partially because of their history and
size, but most critically due to their shared border with Russia. It’s no secret that Russia strongly
opposes both of these countries becoming members of NATO, and in the past two decades
Russia has made several campaigns to derail both Ukraine’s and Georgia’s acquisition of a
membership action plan. It is critical for Russia to remain a primary influence of these two
countries because of their geostrategic location, their past history with the federation, and the
threat that is presented by the two states becoming NATO members. Both Ukraine and Georgia
were part of the Soviet Union prior to its collapse in 1991, and hold unique, deep ties to Russia.
Though there have been tremendous strides of collaboration (and possible integration) between
NATO, Ukraine and Georgia, the last two decades have shown that their membership becoming
a reality will be plagued with many difficulties, largely presented by Russia.
In part, the Ukrainian and Georgian paths for NATO membership are problematic for a
variety of reasons. As stated before, their geography plays a significant part in why both NATO
and Russia want the ability to project influence over the two countries57. Ukraine, located in
Central Europe, plays a crucial role as a buffer state between Russia and NATO. After NATO
enlarged in 2004 and gained the Baltic states, Russia was faced with a reality that NATO could
have military authority along its north-western border. Russia knew, and still holds the notion,
that if Ukraine were to become a member of NATO, the ability to exert influence into central
Europe would drastically decrease. In addition, without influence over Ukraine, Russia loses the
ability to be European superpower58. Significant portions of Russia’s economy, such as natural
gas sales, rely on positive relations with Ukraine. Those relations are prone to stress if Ukraine
were to side with Russia’s competitors. With regards to Georgia, it’s geography is a very
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important trait that makes the country an interest to both Russia and NATO. It’s a country
bordering Turkey (a NATO member state), Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia. The fact that
Georgia is not located in Europe, but still shares a border with Russia, is important. The ability
for NATO to have bases located on the southern border of Russia is paramount to exerting a
military influence in the region. With Georgia as a member state, NATO and Georgian military
forces would be able to train and increase the interoperability of defense mechanisms59. On
Russia’s account, Georgia is a buffer state and an ally. The necessity for Georgia to remain as a
non-member of NATO is crucial for Russia’s ability to remain a major power in the region. Both
Ukraine and Georgia are two states that have positive working relationships with NATO,
however a timeframe for their membership is still a subject of discussion.
Case Study – Georgia
As a newly independent state from the Soviet Union, Georgia began under the leadership
of Gamsakhurdia60. Similar to states that had been granted independence after the collapse of the
Soviet Union, Georgia’s relationship with NATO began in 1992, when the state joined the
NATO-run North Atlantic Cooperation Council. Only two years later, Georgia signed the
Partnership for Peace (PfP). A program that included many other non-member states, the PfP
allowed for Georgia to begin building a lasting relationship with NATO. Continuing on the path
of mutual cooperation, Georgia signed their first Individual Partnership Plan in 1996 and opened
official relations with NATO in 1998. In the early 2000’s, the first joint military exercises
between Georgia and NATO took place. These were the first steps toward a more in-depth
integration between the two. Following on this trend of cooperation with the west, 2003 marked
an important milestone for Georgia; the Rose Revolution. In short, this revolution marked the
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ending of Soviet leadership in the country, and placed Georgia on a path of promoting western
institutions, such as NATO. However, with all the mutual collaboration and effort to foster a
positive relationship that would lead to membership, Georgia has not been offered a Membership
Action Plan. Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty limits membership to countries within
Europe61. While Turkey is not considered a European country, a portion of the state lies within
continental Europe.
In April 2008, the NATO summit in Bucharest occurred. It was here that several
countries, including the United States, called for Georgia to be allowed to join the Membership
Action Plan (MAP). After the suggestion was met with opposition from Germany and France,
the alliance decided not to offer Georgia a MAP because of the possibility it would anger Russia.
That same month, the head of the Russian military, general Yuri Baluyevsky, stated that “Russia
will take steps aimed at ensuring its interests along its borders and these will not only be military
steps, but also steps of a different nature.” Those steps of a different nature consist of aims to halt
Georgia’s integration into NATO. It was after the summit that the Russian president vowed to
protect the republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, two unrecognized republics within Georgia
that have a major Russian presence. Later that year, Georgia sent troops into South Ossetia to
restore constitutional order, but this force met with a much larger Russian assault that extended
to Abkhazia. Before the war in both regions, rallies were held in two cities, Tskhinvali and
Sukhumi, where people of both South Ossetia and Abkhazia appealed to the Russian government
for recognition of their sovereignty62. Once Russia recognized both territories as sovereign states,
Moscow had legitimate reasons to come to their aid. This made it more difficult for Georgia to
quell any rebellions and in turn, keep territorial sovereignty.
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This complicated both NATO – Russian relations, but also NATO – Georgian relations,
as NATO had peacekeeping troops stationed in both regions. All that said, the war in South
Ossetia and Abkhazia placed Georgia farther away from obtaining NATO membership63. In
2009, NATO stated that they would pledge to provide their assistance and support for Georgia’s
reform efforts and it’s recognized territorial integrity. The most recent development between
Georgia and NATO was a “substantive package” of cooperation measures implemented by
NATO in 2014. This included defense capacity building, training, and enhanced interoperability
opportunities for Georgia64. The situation between Georgia, Russia, and NATO is unique
because of the vital role geography comprises when discussing NATO membership. It’s evident
that Russia will, to the best of its ability, stop Georgia from obtaining a MAP and joining NATO
through military and diplomatic means.
Case Study – Ukraine
With the fall of the Soviet Union, Ukraine gained its independence and became a
sovereign state. Similar to Georgia, Ukraine officially began relations with NATO in 1994, when
the state joined the Partnership for Peace program. There were multiple levels of cooperation and
partnership leading into the 2000s, such as the creation of a NATO-Ukraine commission in 1997,
and the Ukrainian president Kuchma’s declaration in 2002 that Ukraine wanted to join NATO.
However, during this presidency, relations between the United States and Ukraine soured due to
several scandals that erupted (one of which involving the transfer of a sophisticated Ukrainian
defense system to Iraq)65. In 2004, the Orange Revolution occurred and replaced Kuchama’s
government with Yushchenko, a prominent supporter of Ukraine becoming a member of NATO.
Following suit, the 2008 Bucharest summit resulted in Ukraine not obtaining a Membership
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Action Plan for various reasons. Both France and Germany disagreed with the potential decision
to offer Ukraine a MAP because of their need to reform internally (meeting the standards of a
NATO member), and the impact that offering Ukraine a MAP would have on NATO – Russia
relations. The Yanukovych presidency marked an interesting time period with regard to Ukraine
and NATO. The administration held the belief that Ukraine’s cooperation with NATO was
sufficient and that the country did not need to press joining NATO with urgency66. During this
presidency, Ukraine declared its status as a non-aligned state and passed a bill that excluded the
goal of further expediting Ukraine’s membership in NATO, but continued cooperation programs
with NATO (this included training Ukrainian troops and participating in peacekeeping missions
in Afghanistan and Iraq). Following suit, the Ukrainian president chose to side with Russia yet
again regarding an oil deal that would effectively reduce the cost of oil, supplied by Russia, to
Ukraine by about 33%67. This deal also involved a $15 billion-dollar buyout of Ukrainian
government bonds provided by Russia to Ukraine, opposing the European Union’s offer of close
to $1 billion dollars. This deal was made amid massive protests in Ukraine that urged more proEuropean Union integration. Although this deal between Ukraine and Russia was not connected
to NATO directly, the president’s pro-Russian integration decision making continued to affect
the relationship between Ukraine and western countries, effectively making NATO-Ukrainian
relations more difficult to establish. It wasn’t until the Euromaidan in 2014 that Yanukovych fled
from Ukraine amid massive protests, stemming from Ukrainian dissatisfaction with corruption
and a lack of European integration, that Ukraine elected a pro-western government. That same
year, Ukraine set obtaining NATO membership as a priority68.
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Though Ukraine became a pro-west leaning country in 2014, Russia expressed its
extreme dissatisfaction with the sudden shift. Russia sees Ukraine as an important ally that
divides NATO’s border with Russia’s, creating a buffer on the vast expanse of Russia’s western
territory. It was made public in 2008, after the Bucharest summit, that Russia would target its
missiles at Ukraine if it joins NATO and accepts the deployment of a missile defense shield69. In
addition, Vladimir Putin asserted that if Ukraine joined NATO, Russia could contend their
integration by annexing the Ukrainian East and Crimea. Leading into 2014 with the removal of
the pro-Russian president Yanukovych, Russia invaded and annexed Crimea, as well as began
military operations in Ukraine’s eastern territories. This was only after Ukraine elected an
increasingly pro-west president, who called for further Ukrainian – NATO integration. Eastern
Ukraine has a large population of ethnic Russians. It’s important to note that this population
supports further integration between Russia and Ukraine. The ideological divisions between
Eastern Ukraine and Western Ukraine contribute to the reasons Russia was able to justify its
annexation of Crimea and involvement within Ukraine’s borders. Regarding current efforts taken
by Ukraine to become a part of NATO, once Ukraine meets and fulfills the standards to join the
security alliance, the state will hold a referendum to decide if the population would like to move
further with NATO membership.
NATO Membership and Russian Intervention
Taking a closer look into this situation, the conflict between Russia and Ukraine is
surprisingly similar to that of the war in South Ossetia. Both conflicts ensued because of Russia’s
fear that the state was losing its influential grip on Ukraine and Georgia to NATO. It was made
apparent by member states, such as Germany and France, that the risk of inviting Ukraine and
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Georgia to join NATO was not worth provoking Russia. The possibility of these two countries
becoming full members of NATO was drastically hindered following the conflicts that occurred
with Russia in Crimea and South Ossetia, seeing as they no longer met the NATO standards of
possessing complete sovereignty over their territory. Could the conflicts between Russia,
Ukraine and Georgia depict that the reasonable limits of NATO expansion have been reached70?
It’s become apparent that NATO must decide between a positive relationship with Russia or its
desired expansion, including Ukraine and Georgia, two states that share a strategic border with
Russia.
The idea of Ukraine and Georgia becoming members of NATO is contingent on several
factors. First and foremost, NATO seeks to only add states that meet the criteria and standards
that are put forth and outlined in Membership Action Plans. An important stipulation of these
MAPs dictate that the state must have a concrete grip on their territorial sovereignty. That being
said, Russia’s aim is to sustain conflicts within Ukraine and Georgia, preventing the two
countries from joining NATO or the European Union71. It was seen in 2008, with the Russian –
Georgian war in South Ossetia, and in 2014, with the annexation of Crimea, that membership for
both Ukraine and Georgia raises a high risk of aggravating Russia and creating military conflict.
Russia’s modernization and advancement of its military in the past two decades has placed
western nations and NATO in a difficult position with regard to enlarging NATO. After carefully
assessing the viability of including both states into the security alliance, it’s evident that future
conflict could further erupt in Eastern Europe and North-West Asia if NATO continues its goal
of creating a unified Europe under the security alliance.

42

Comparative Meeting the
Factors standards to
Case
Studies

obtain a MAP

Mutual interest in Russian reaction
membership:
to membership/
NATO and states possible
accession

Russian
aggression

Poland

Poland met the
requirements to obtain
a MAP rather quickly
after the fall of the
Soviet Union.

Poland sought to
protect itself from
foreign aggressors
through NATO
membership. NATO
expanding into central
Europe was key in
demonstrating
territorial influence.

Russia viewed
Poland’s accession
into NATO as an
insult. There was an
unspoken agreement
that NATO borders
would not expand past
a reunified Germany.

Poland has not
experienced Russian
military aggression.
The country has,
however, experienced
Russian
misinformation
campaigns.

The Baltics

The Baltic states
suffered economically
and militarily after the
fall of the Soviet
Union, but were able
to democratize
quicker than expected.

The Baltic states saw
NATO membership as
a key resource in
keeping Russia from
making military
advances (Article 5).
NATO viewed Baltic
accession as a way to
share a border with
Russia.

Russia saw Baltic
membership in NATO
as a direct threat to
their national security.
With a Western
military alliance on
the northwestern
border, Russia has
increased their
military presence
along the shared
border with Latvia
and Estonia.

The Baltic states have
witnessed a large
Russian military
presence along the
eastern borders of
Latvia and Estonia.
This is due to their
membership with
NATO.

Ukraine and
Georgia

Ukraine and Georgia
are two countries that
are heavily influenced
by Russia. They
currently do not meet
the necessary
requirements due to
territorial instability
and Article 10.

Both Ukraine and
Georgia want to
become members of
NATO. However, in
order to prevent
Russian aggression,
those countries have
not been offered
MAPs.

Moscow has made it
apparent that they
would not allow
Ukraine and Georgia
to become members
of NATO. Either
through military
action (which has
been seen) or other
means, their
membership in the
security alliance is
where Russia draws
the line.

Ukraine and Georgia
have experienced
Russian military
aggression due to their
geographic nature and
increased
collaboration with
NATO.

Table 1. Comparative factors between the three case studies.
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CONCLUSION
Over the past two decades, NATO enlargement has shifted the tide of European power
dynamics within the international community. The cases studies that I’ve analyzed in this paper
show a direct correlation between NATO expanding into Eastern Europe and an increase in
Russian antagonism. Though there are other countries that have an extensive working
relationship with NATO, the case studies that I’ve used proved to be the most descriptive with
answering the research question, stated at the beginning. The chart above depicts a few of the
factors that apply to all three of the case studies I’ve written about in this paper. Comparing
Poland, the Baltic states, and Ukraine and Georgia with these factors yields for a more
summarized understanding of their connection to NATO and Russia.
Poland
The first case study that I analyzed, Poland, became a sovereign country after the
dissolution of the Soviet Union. This country, along with the Czech Republic and Hungary, was
involved in the first round of NATO enlargement in 1999. Due to Poland’s rapid democratization
and stable economy, this country was able to obtain a MAP and begin its integration into NATO
rather quickly. Compared to other countries that were seeking NATO membership at the time,
Poland was a particularly important player in Central Europe due to its geostrategic positioning.
Poland’s hasty accession into NATO paved the road ahead for countries such as the Baltic states
to be next in line for membership.
Regarding both the interests of Poland and NATO, membership within the security
alliance suited Poland’s needs and advanced the goals of NATO. As stated earlier in my paper,
Poland was under the direct influence of Russia for most of the 20th century. After the break-up
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of the Soviet Union, it was in Poland’s best interest to become a member of NATO in order to
prevent future Russian bellicosity. As a country that sought to retain its sovereignty, the best
option was to side with the West. The leadership of NATO was interested in expanding more
into Central Europe. Russian imperialism and aggression in the 20th century enveloped all of
Eastern Europe and most of Central Europe. With the Warsaw Pact dissolved, and Russia forced
to retreat from Central Europe, it was in NATOs best interest to expand eastward, pushing its
border of collective security closer to Russia.
Russia’s reaction to NATO enlargement into Central Europe was met with contention. As
stated earlier in this paper, there was an unspoken agreement that NATO membership would not
expand past a reunified Germany, father into Eastern Europe. As the first round of enlargement
progressed, there were major changes that had to be made regarding Russia’s foreign policy. One
of which, was that Russia, soon after, viewed NATO enlargement as a direct threat to national
security. Facing the reality that a key geostrategic country in Central Europe was now a member
of a Western lead security alliance, Russia made it clear that there would be repercussions if
eastward expansion continued.
Since becoming a member of NATO, Poland has not experienced direct Russian
belligerence. Unlike the Baltic states, Georgia and Ukraine, Poland has not been threatened by
Russian military action, or fallen victim to cyberattacks. The only Russian retaliation that Poland
has experienced from joining NATO is small misinformation campaigns, and government
interference. Russian lead misinformation campaigns are prevalent in most countries that cannot
be directly influenced by Russia and are allied with Western institutions (like NATO). Poland
has had pro-Russian officials enter positions of power, such as in the Ministry of Defense. These
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actions taken by Russia against Poland, however, are not as significant as those taken against the
Baltics, Georgia and Ukraine.
The Baltic States
The second case study that was analyzed within this paper, the Baltic States, became
sovereign countries after the break-up of the Soviet Union. The second round of enlargement
(since the reunification of Germany) included Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and of
course, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. The Baltic States were able to receive MAPs rather
quickly, as they democratized shortly after the break of the Soviet Union. The only factor that
was theoretically able to hinder the chances of the three countries receiving MAPs was Russia’s
reaction.
Regarding both the interests of the Baltic States and NATO, both parties stood to benefit
from membership. Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia were all part of the Soviet Union prior to its
collapse. In searching for avenues to maintain their territorial sovereignty, NATO membership
presented itself to be the greatest asset. As members of a collective security alliance, the Baltics
would have the authority to invoke Article 5 (i.e. calling on the other members of NATO to
assist) if militarily provoked. This is arguably the most important reason for NATO membership,
when discussing smaller Eastern European countries. If Russia were to take military action on
any three of the Baltic countries, they would be able to call upon other members for assistance.
Regarding NATOs interest in adding the Baltics to the security alliance, doing so pushes its
borders against Russia’s western front. Latvia and Estonia share a border with Russia in the
northwest. Once members of NATO, Latvia and Estonia would be able to build western lead
military bases on land that connects with Russia.
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Russia’s reaction to the Baltic States joining NATO was extremely negative. The Baltic
States accession into the security alliance was perceived by as a direct threat to national security.
Not only were the Baltic states now out of Russia’s sphere of influence, but the United States and
Western European countries were now able to build NATO military bases in Latvia, Estonia, and
Lithuania. The connecting of both NATO and Russian borders was seen by Moscow as a
complete overstepping of boundaries and unequal.
In response, Russia has taken several actions over the past decade. In 2007, Estonia
experienced a large scale cyberattack from Russia that disabled crucial banking systems and
government websites. Instead, when Estonians tried to visit certain government websites, they
would be redirected to pro-Russian propaganda. Cyber warfare is one of the many tools that
Russia uses in misinformation campaigns. This was extraordinarily powerful because it disrupted
an entire economy, making the cyberattack more impactful than a mere propaganda wave. In
recent years, Russia has begun building a large military presence of hundreds of thousands of
soldiers, artillery, and tanks on its northwestern border with Estonia and Latvia. This is directly
in response to NATO building military instillations and running drills within the Baltic states.
This type of military buildup inevitably causes a security dilemma, and a further escalation of
tensions.
Georgia and Ukraine
The third case study analyzed within this paper was Georgia and Ukraine. These two
countries have always been, and continue to be, under direct influence from Russia. Due to
several factors, both countries have not yet received MAPs. At the Bucharest Summit in 2008,
NATO was considering offering Georgia and Ukraine MAPs, however the notion was contested
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by several Western European countries. In an effort to not provoke Russia, the two countries had
to wait more time before they received a course for membership. Though Ukraine and Georgia
may not have received their MAPs for several reasons, the first and foremost factor considered
was Russia’s possible response.
Regarding a mutual interest of membership between NATO, Georgia and Ukraine,
membership would be extremely beneficial for all parties involved. If Georgia and Ukraine were
to become members of NATO, they would no longer have to fear military action from Russia.
Though the threat would always be present, the response to Russian military intervention would
be countered by Article 5 and in turn, the full force of NATO. Like the Baltics and other small
European countries that do not have the resources to fend off Russia’s military, Georgia and
Ukraine would benefit tremendously from the security alliance aspect. NATO also stands to
benefit greatly from Georgia and Ukraine joining the alliance, specifically because of the shared
border with Russia. NATOs border would then comprise most of Russia’s western front, as well
as a stretch of land on the south.
Russia’s reaction to the possibility of Georgia and Ukraine joining the alliance was made
apparent through military action. In 2008, Russia invaded regions in Georgia. In 2014, Russia
invaded eastern Ukraine and annexed the Crimean Peninsula. Through these military invasions
and land grabs, Russia destabilized the territorial sovereignty of both Georgia and Ukraine. A
key and necessary aspect of NATO membership states that in order to receive a MAP, a country
must have complete territorial sovereignty over its borders. Through invading both Ukraine and
Georgia, Russia ensured that these two countries will not be applicable to receive a MAP in the
foreseeable future.
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